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How do financial analysts interpret industrial firms’ corporate refocusing announcements? 
Abstract 
This study investigates how analysts perceive the effect of corporate refocusing announcements 
on UK industrial firms’ future earnings by examining current-year and one-year-ahead earnings 
forecast revisions, current-year target price revisions and earnings forecast errors in the five 
years surrounding a refocusing announcement year. The results reveal that analysts adjust their 
earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year and the following two years, 
predicting that operating performance in the post-refocusing period is likely to decline relative to 
their former earnings forecasts.  Secondly, there is no evidence that analysts issue biased 
earnings forecasts after refocusing announcements or that their forecasts appear less accurate. 
Thirdly, they adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year with 
downward market movement. However, they do not similarly adjust their earnings forecast 
upward with upward market movement. The magnitude of downward adjustments exceeds that 
of upward adjustments. They also adjust current-year target price forecasts downward with 
downward market movement in the year prior to a refocusing announcement. 
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1. Introduction 
A review of the decades from the 1960s to the 2000s reveals an increase in the frequency and 
value of corporate refocusing activities in both the UK and the US (Mulherin and Boone, 2000; 
Haynes, Thompson and Wright, 2003; Powell and Yawson, 2005; Colak, 2010; Donelson, 
Jennings and McInnis, 2011). These corporate events draw the attention of the investment 
community because (i) they represent significant changes to firms’ business strategies, which can 
alter the sustainability of earnings, cash flows and dividends (Mak, Strong and Walker, 2011; 
Mak, 2014); (ii) they introduce a series of material restructuring charges that can make it difficult 
for analysts to identify firms’ core operating income, which indicates the sustainability of 
earnings (Penman, 2010; Donelson et al., 2011; Wahlen, Baginski and Bradshaw, 2011; Mak, et 
al. 2011)
1
; and (iii) the uncertainty of firms’ operational performance in the post-refocusing 
period complicates analysts’ forecasting (Alford and Berger, 1999). Therefore, these events 
provide a unique opportunity to study the process by which analysts interpret information when 
uncertainty arises (Ramnath, Rock and Shane, 2008; Bradshaw, 2012). As analysts’ forecasts are 
one of the main information sources guiding investors’ decision making, their efficiency could 
affect the process of pricing in the capital markets; this particularly applies in case of refocusing.  
This paper firstly investigates how analysts interpret refocusing announcements. It does so by 
examining the changes in forecast revisions (i.e., current-year and one-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts and current-year target price forecasts) in the five years centred on a refocusing 
announcement year (here after the five-year period). Secondly, it examines how refocusing 
announcements and restructuring charges affect earnings forecast bias and accuracy in the five-
year period. Thirdly, it focuses on how analysts adjust their forecasts in response to good news 
                                                          
1 Please refer to Mr. P. Malmqvist’s presentation  of “ICAS – What is performance?” at 39th European Accounting 
Association annual congress at Maastricht, Netherland, on 12th May 2016.  
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and bad news proxied by excess stock returns. The study conjectures that to minimise forecast 
errors and bias when they encounter the uncertainty associated with refocusing, analysts might 
exploit the opportunity to collect information about firms’ refocusing plans and monitor their 
performance (Barron, Kim, Lim and Steven, 1998; Barron, Byard and Yu, 2008)
2
. In addition, 
they cannot ignore former errors or the information about future earnings revealed in share prices 
(Clement, Hales and Xue, 2011; Ho, Strong and Walker, 2012). In other words, analysts’ 
forecasting behaviour might be different when they encounter the uncertainty associated with 
refocusing than when they operate in a normal business environment, as suggested by the 
underreaction hypothesis (Abarbanell, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Zhang 2006) and 
the systematic optimism literature (Das, Levine and Sivaramakishnan, 1998; Eastwood and Nutt, 
1999).  
The results demonstrate that analysts adjust current-year and one-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year and the following two years. They also 
adjust the target price downward in the year preceding and the year after a refocusing 
announcement year. These findings suggest that firms’ operating performance in a post-
refocusing period is likely to decline relative to analysts’ former earnings forecasts. The research 
further reveals material current-year earnings forecast errors in a refocusing announcement year 
and the year prior to a refocusing announcement. However, there is no evidence to indicate that 
analysts issue biased current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts or that their forecasts 
are less accurate in two years following a refocusing announcement. Finally, they react 
asymmetrically to bad news and good news. They adjust current and one-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts downward where there is downward market movement in the refocusing announcement 
                                                          
2 Please see also the Thomson Reuters’ user manual for I/B/E/S data – “Methodology for estimates: a guide to 
understanding Thomoson Reuters methodologies, terms and policies for I/B/E/S estimates databases”  (July 2013, 
p.8).   
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year. However, they do not similarly adjust earnings forecasts upward with upward market 
movement. The magnitude of downward adjustments is greater than that of upward adjustments. 
Analysts also adjust current-year target price forecasts downward with downward market 
movement in the year prior to a refocusing announcement. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing up-to-date evidence to demonstrate how 
analysts derive forecasts when encountering the uncertainty associated with the refocusing. This 
is important because since the work of Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (1999), there have been few 
studies which have reported the effect of refocusing on analysts’ forecasts (Bradshaw, 2012). 
Differing from Chaney et al. (1999), I adopt a propensity score-matching technique to focus 
exclusively on the effect of refocusing announcements on analysts’ forecasts after controlling for 
other factors that might inform managers’ refocusing decisions. Secondly, I observe that 
analysts’ forecasts are efficient for the five-year period. During this period, they learn from past 
errors and reflect on the information revealed by past stock returns. They also refer to a wealth of 
information to minimise their forecast errors and bias. Apart from the five-year period, my 
results show that their forecasts are inefficient for the rest of the period. Thirdly, I demonstrate 
that analysts’ asymmetric reactions to good and bad news are based on the nature of the 
refocusing announcements. These results contribute to the debate about the rationality of 
analysts’ forecasts. 
This paper adopts Mak et al.’s (2011) definition of corporate refocusing as a type of asset 
restructuring. A firm can undertake refocusing in three ways. The first is downsizing by 
divesting peripheral, loss-making or unimportant business segments to focus on its original core 
business. Second, in addition to divesting, it can intensify investment in its original core business 
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by acquiring related business segments. Third, it can exit its original core business after a series 
of divestments to acquire a new business and enter a new core area.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the literature 
review and hypotheses; Section 3 describes the research design; Section 4 describes the research 
sample and the data; Section 5 reports the empirical findings; and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
2.1 Changes in analysts’ interpretations of firms’ refocusing announcements 
The content of the information issued in a refocusing announcement informs the variations 
noted in analysts’ forecasts. This study covers the activities of downsizing, investing in an 
original core business, and entering into a new business. These activities involve the utilisation 
of any disposal proceeds. A downsizing announcement might be treated as good news if the firm 
states that it will utilise disposal proceeds to relieve any financial distress and to improve future 
operating performance (Ofek, 1993; Lasfer, Sudarsanam and Taffler 1996). However, an 
announcement might be treated as bad news if the assets’ disposal proceeds are less than the net 
present value of the expected future cash inflows generated by the assets (Penman, 2010). This 
occurs when firms do not bargain for an optimal selling price for assets and simply search for a 
quick sale, acting under the pressure of financial distress (Shleifer and Vishny, 2002). The worst 
situation arises when firms forego profitable investment projects and are unsuccessful in 
reducing financial distress (Myers, 1977), as this can affect long-term firm performance. An 
announcement of intention to focus on the original core business might be treated as good news 
if the firm will invest the disposal proceeds in the related profit-making business and maintain 
financial flexibility (Hite, Owers and Rogers, 1987). However, it might be treated as bad news if 
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managers are judged to be making sub-optimal investments in pursuit of personal benefits and 
power, instead of protecting shareholders’ wealth creation (Jensen, 1986). Jensen’s free cash-
flow theory is applicable to announcements when entering a new business. Furthermore, in 
comparison to the former two types of announcements, the risk and uncertainty when embarking 
on a new business is considered greater. Managers encounter difficulties convincing analysts and 
investors of the feasibility of their proposals and in persuading them to treat these proposals as 
good news. Details about refocusing announcements also affect analysts’ forecasts, particularly 
when assessing the feasibility of firms’ refocusing plans. Detailed announcements also show 
managers’ strong commitment to turning around their firm’s strategic positions. Therefore, I 
hypothesise that: 
H1a: Analysts’ current-year earnings forecast revisions are negatively (positively) associated 
with the refocusing announcement year if they expect a decline (improvement) in firms’ future 
earnings. 
H1b: Analysts’ one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions are negatively (positively) associated 
with the refocusing announcement year if they expect a decline (improvement) in firms’ future 
earnings. 
The target price represents the analyst’s view of a firm’s value after considering different 
types of information, including long-term earnings forecasts (Bradshaw, 2012). As refocusing 
activities represent significant changes to business strategy and might alter the pattern of future 
earnings and cash flows, I further hypothesise that:  
H1c: Analysts’ target price revisions are negatively (positively) associated with the refocusing 
announcement year if they expect a decline (improvement) in firms’ future earnings 
performance. 
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2.2 Analysts’ forecast bias, accuracy and efficiency of processing information 
One stream of studies shows that analysts underreact to the information revealed in prior 
stock price changes (Abarbanell, 1991; Ali et al., 1992) and their own past errors (Ali et al., 
1992).  Chaney, Hogan and Jeter (1999) do not find these results but show that analysts’ forecast 
bias and accuracy decline in the year following restructuring charges.  They conclude that 
analysts are still optimistically biased. On the other hand, Thomson Reuters presents that 
analysts provide their “best guess” in deriving forecasts and monitoring firms’ performance 
during the period of refocusing (see footnote 2).  Therefore, it is important to investigate the 
changes in forecast bias and accuracy in the year following a refocusing announcement while 
controlling for the effect of prior stock returns and past errors.  I hypothesise that:     
H1d: Analysts’ current-year forecast errors (absolute errors) in the year after a refocusing 
announcement are negatively (positively) associated with the refocusing announcement year. 
H1e: Analysts’ one-year-ahead forecast errors (absolute errors) in the year after a refocusing 
announcement are negatively (positively) associated with the refocusing announcement year. 
2.3 Analysts’ asymmetric reactions to good and bad news  
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) argue that the nature of news affects analysts’ reactions. For 
example, their results show analysts systematically overreact to positive prior earnings 
performance and underreact to negative prior earnings performance. Kasznik and McNichols 
(2002) find analysts’ forecast revisions exhibit a differential response to positive and negative 
earnings surprises. Elsewhere, Zhang (2006) shows analysts adjust their earnings forecasts 
upwards following good news, but adjust forecasts downwards more strongly following bad 
news and when they are subject to greater information uncertainty. He argues that these results 
are consistent with a post-analyst-revision drift and support the hypothesis that analysts 
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underreact. Ho, Strong and Walker (2012) explain this phenomenon in relation to the 
information disclosure behaviour of managers (Kothari et al., 2009). They conjecture that 
analysts obtain good news from managers privately, but discover bad news only when managers 
announce it. In other words, analysts’ asymmetric reactions to good news and bad news are 
stronger when managers accumulate and disclose more bad news. Helbok and Walker (2003) 
show that analysts are aware of the effect of accounting conservatism on reported earnings and 
how it affects future earnings. At the beginning of a financial year, they derive earnings forecasts 
based on sustainable earnings and ignore the impact of transitory items on the current-year 
earnings. Later in the year, they adjust their current-year earnings forecasts in response to good 
news and bad news of transitory items.  
I argue that there is asymmetric timeliness in the realization of good and bad news in relation 
to refocusing events. When firms undertake refocusing, costs are incurred (e.g., restructuring 
charges, costs of labour cutting and compensation). The realisation of benefits (such as the 
possibilities for improvement in future earnings) is linked to how managers undertake refocusing 
in the future. The asymmetry in the realisation of bad news and good news is reflected in 
reported earnings and accruals via conditional conservatism (Mak et al. 2011). This implies that 
analysts’ reactions to bad news differ from their reactions to good news. Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are developed:  
H2a (2b, 2c): Analysts’ current-year earnings forecast (one-year-ahead earnings forecast, target 
price) revisions are more strongly associated with bad news (proxied by firms’ negative excess 
stock returns) in a refocusing announcement year than with good news (proxied by firms’ 
positive excess stock returns).  
3. Research design 
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3.1 Analysts’ forecast revisions 
Following Hoden, Peel and Thompson (1990), I define analysts’ current-year and one-year-
ahead earnings forecast revisions and target price revisions as follows (please refer to Figure 1 
for the various time points).  
  1,12,1,,  titmitmitti PFFFRV  (1) 
where t
tiFRV ,  
denotes the current-year earnings forecast revision for firm i in year t
3
,
 
 
 t
miF 1,  
is mean current-year earnings forecast for firm i in the 1
st
-month before the 
I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t
4
,  
 t
miF 12,  
is mean current-year earnings forecast for firm i in the 12
th
-month before the 
I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t, and 
 
1, tiP  is the price per share 12 months before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement 
date of year t. 
I calculate one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions (
1
,
t
tiFRV ) in the same fashion by 
replacing 
t
miF 1,  with 
1
1,
t
miF  and 
t
miF 12,  with 
1
12,
t
miF . The definition of target price revisions is 
  1,12,1,,  titmitmitti PTPTPTPRV  (2) 
where t
tiTPRV ,  
denotes the current-year target price revision for firm i in year t,  
                                                          
3 For 
t
tiFRV , the superscript t indicates that the forecast revision ( FRV ) of firm i is for the current year.  The 
subscript t indicates that the forecast is made during the current year.  For,
1
,
t
tiFRV , the superscript t+1 indicates 
that the forecast revision ( FRV ) of firm i is for one-year-ahead. The subscript t remains the same as the above.  
The same fashion of presentation is for other variables of forecasts. 
4 I obtain similar results and the same conclusion when adopting the median earnings forecasts for deriving forecast 
revisions and forecast errors in Section 3.2. 
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 t
miTP 1,  
is the mean current-year target price forecast for firm i in the 1
st
-month 
before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t, and 
 t
miTP 12,  is the mean current-year target price forecast for firm i in the 12
th
-month  
before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
Chaney et al. (1999, 2000) assert that analysts do not typically adjust three-years-ahead and 
five-years-ahead earnings forecasts downward. This implies they consider the effect of 
restructuring charges on earnings as only short term. However, the literature pertaining to market 
performance and restructuring indicates that it takes time (i.e., two to three years) to realise the 
benefits and cost advantages of restructuring (Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks, 1998; Bates, 2005; 
Mak, Strong and Walker, 2011), which might be expected to influence analysts’ forecasts. In 
other words, firms’ earnings performance in a post-refocusing period might then affect analysts’ 
forecasts, causing them to differ from their forecasts prior to a refocusing announcement. 
Accordingly, this research measures the earnings forecast revisions and target price revisions 
over the five-year period. The univariate results demonstrate how analysts’ perception changes in 
response to the information disclosed by firms. Subsequently, I test hypotheses H1a, H1b and 
H1c applying the following multivariate model (3).  
ti
y
yytidmtit
f
fififf
f
fiff
f
fiff
f
fftitititi
t
ti
DHindexRECESSAROIUNEXPD
UNEXPDOIDDOIUNEXPUNEXPOIFRV
,
2010
98
,,6125,4
2
2
,,
2
2
,
2
2
,
2
2
,,3,2,1,
                 
 









  
(3) 
where ttiFRV ,  denotes the current-year earnings forecast revisions for firm i in year t, as it is 
defined at model (1).  It can be replaced by one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions ( 1,
t
tiFRV ) 
or the current-year target price revision ( ttiTPRV , ). tiOI , is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
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operating income to net total assets ratio for firm i in year t is less than zero and is 0 otherwise. 
As Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992) show, analysts’ forecasts are biased upwards for firms 
experiencing operating losses; therefore, the coefficient 
1  should be negative. tiUNEXP ,  denotes 
unexpected earnings, defined as the price-scaled earnings forecast errors for firm i in year t-1 
( 11


t
tEr ), as expressed in model (4) in the following. Its coefficient 2  measures the association 
between forecast revisions and unexpected earnings. titi OIUNEXP ,,  is an interactive term and its 
coefficient 3  measures the sensitivity of forecast revisions to unexpected earnings when an 
operating loss is present.  
To capture the effect of refocusing announcements on forecast revisions, I introduce fD to 
represent a refocusing announcement year and two years on either side, where f takes the values 
of –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2.  For example, 0D  equals 1 if year t is the refocusing announcement year 
and is 0 otherwise. The coefficient f ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) measures the sensitivity of 
forecast revisions to the refocusing announcement in the five-year period.  If analysts perceive 
the refocusing announcement as good news for future earnings on average (e.g., expecting 
improvements in future earnings, future reversals of excess current accruals, clear business 
objectives, elimination of unproductive assets, and control of production costs), then 0  will be 
positively significant. However, if analysts perceive the refocusing announcement as bad news 
(e.g., expecting asset disposals to defend against takeovers, failure to make an acquisition, relief 
of financial distress in the short term without a clear strategic objective), 0  will be negatively 
significant. If the refocusing announcement is uninformative for analysts, 0 is expected to be 
zero. 2 , 1 , 1  and 2  measure the changes in analysts’ forecast revisions in event years –2,  
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–1, 1 or 2.  The rest of the years are those that are at least two years away from a refocusing 
announcement year.  fif OID ,  is an interactive variable and its coefficient f  ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 
and 2) measures the sensitivity of forecast revisions to the operating loss over the five-year 
period, including analysts’ response to the refocusing announcement year (Hogan and Jeter, 
1998). Similarly, fifUNEXPD , is an interactive variable and its coefficient f  measures the 
sensitivity of forecast revisions to the unexpected earnings over the five-year period. Following 
the same fashion, fifif OIUNEXPD ,, is an interactive variable of the five-year period, unexpected 
earnings and the operating loss.  Its coefficient f  measures the sensitivity of forecast revisions 
to the unexpected earnings and operating loss over the five-year period.   
tiAR , , excess stock returns, are equal to the difference between firm i’s stock returns and the 
market returns at the end of financial year t. The measurement period of excess stock returns 
concludes earlier than the first month prior to the earnings announcement date (m1 in Figure 1). 
Clement et al. (2011) show that analysts refer to firms’ stock returns when deriving their own 
forecasts. Therefore, tiAR ,  controls for this effect.  Its coefficient 4 is expected to be positive.  
mtRECESS 12 is an indicative variable equal to 1 if an economic recession occurred in the past 12 
months of year t.  According to Jacob (1997), analysts’ forecasts are affected by economic 
recession, therefore, its coefficient 5 is expected to be negative. According to Colak (2010), 
competition affects firms’ performance and their decision to undertake refocusing. This should 
also affect analysts’ revision forecast. I include the Herfindahl index ( tidHindex ,, ) for firm i in 
industry d in year t. Its coefficient 6  is expected to be negative. yD  are year-dummies across 
the sample period.  
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The novel feature of model (3) is that fD can capture changes in analysts’ perceptions of 
firms’ performance and refocusing announcements over the five-year period exclusively after 
controlling for the effect of unexpected earnings, operating loss, the joint effect of unexpected 
earnings and operating loss in each of the five years, firms’ historical returns performance, and 
other control variables. 
3.2 Analysts’ forecast errors 
Current-year earnings forecast error are defined as 
  11,,,  ttmititti PFXEr  (4) 
where ttiEr , denotes the current-year earnings forecast error for firm i in year t
5.  
tiX , represents firm i’s realised earnings in year t from the I/B/E/S Actual file.    
Other variables are defined in model (1). 
Current-year mean absolute error ( t tiMAE , ) and current-year root mean square error (
t
tiRMSE , ) 
for firm i in year t are defined as 
n
PFX
MAE
t
t
mitit
ti
11,,
,
 
  
(5) 
  
n
PFX
RMSE
t
t
mitit
ti
 

2
11,,
,
 
(6) 
One-year-ahead earnings forecast errors (
1
,
t
tiEr , 
1
,
t
tiMAE and 
1
,
t
tiRMSE ) are defined in the same 
way, by replacing 
t
miF 1,  with 
1
1,
t
miF  and replacing tiX ,  with 1, tiX . Firstly, I measure these forecast 
                                                          
5 For 
t
tiEr , the superscript t indicates that the earnings forecast error ( Er ) of firm i is for the current year.  The 
subscript t indicates that the earnings forecast error is made during the current year.  For,
1
,
t
tiEr , the superscript t+1 
indicates that the earnings forecast error ( Er ) of firm i is for one-year-ahead. The subscript t remains the same as 
the above.  The same fashion of presentation for other earnings forecast errors. 
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errors over the five-year period, centring on the refocusing announcement year (0), to 
demonstrate the changes in analysts’ bias and accuracy. Then, I test hypotheses H1d and H1e 
applying Models (7), (8), (9) and (10). Models (7) and (8) are developed based on the work of 
Chaney et al. (1999) and Ali et al. (1992): 
ti
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yytidmt
f f f
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(8) 
where for model (7) tiEr ,  is a common term, which denotes the current-year earnings forecast 
error ( ttiEr , ) for firm i in year t.  It can be replaced by one-year-ahead earnings forecast error       
(
1
,
t
tiEr ).  Similarly, 1, tiEr  is another common term and denotes the lagged current-year 
earnings forecast error ( 11,


t
tiEr ).  It can be replaced by the lagged one-year-ahead earnings 
forecast error    ( ttiEr 1,  ).  According to Chaney et al. (1999) and Ali et al. (1992), the lagged 
forecast error 1, tiEr  reveals whether analysts fully digest and react to information proceeding 
from their own past errors. If its coefficient 1  is positively significant, this implies that analysts 
have failed to learn from their former errors.  I include the lagged stock returns of firm i at the 
end of financial year t–1, 1, tiR , to test whether analysts react fully to information contained in 
historical stock returns. If its coefficient 
2  is positively significant, this suggests that analysts 
have failed to digest the information revealed in historical stock returns about future earnings. 
tiFq ,  represents the logarithm for the number of analysts issuing forecasts for firm i in the 1
st
-
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month before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t (m1 in Figure 1). As the number 
of analysts issuing forecasts for a firm increases, the earnings forecast error should decrease.  Its 
coefficient 3 is expected to be negative.   
To demonstrate the effect of refocusing announcements on earnings forecast errors, in the 
same fashion as model (3), I introduce fD  to represent a refocusing announcement year and two 
years on either side, where f takes the values of –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2.  Its coefficient f                  
( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) measures the sensitivity of earnings forecast errors to a refocusing 
announcement in the five-year period.  The coefficient for the refocusing announcement year, 
0  is expected to be negatively significant if the analysts derive significant bias (or error in 
model (8)) in the refocusing announcement year. The statistical significance of coefficients 
2
and 
1 might depend on firms’ performance prior to the refocusing announcement year.  The 
coefficients 
1 and 2 may be statistically insignificant if analysts treat the refocusing activity 
and restructuring charges as a temporary event.  The rest of the years are those that are at least 
two years away from a refocusing announcement year.   
To test whether analysts fully digest the information gleaned from their past errors and from 
historical stock returns over the five-year period centred on the refocusing announcement year, I 
include an interactive term 1, fif ErD .  Its coefficient f  ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) measures the 
sensitivity of earnings forecast errors to the lagged forecast errors over the five-year period.  
Another interactive term is for five-year period and the lagged stock returns, 1, fif RD . Its 
coefficient f ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) measures the sensitivity of earnings forecast errors to the 
lagged stock returns over the same period.  I also include an interactive term for five-year period 
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and number of analysts, tif FqD , .  Its coefficient f ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) measures the 
sensitivity of earnings forecasts errors to the number of analysts following the firm i.   
For model (8), tiEr ,  is a common term and denotes current-year mean absolute forecast 
error (
t
tiMAE , ) and current-year root mean square forecast error (
t
tiRMSE , ) of firm i in year t. It 
can be replaced by one-year-ahead forecast errors ( 1,
t
tiMAE ,
1
,
t
tiRMSE ).  Similarly, 1, tiEr  is a 
common term and represents the lagged current-year mean absolute forecast error ( 11,


t
tiMAE ) and 
the lagged current-year root mean square forecast error ( 11,


t
tiRMSE ).  It can be replaced by the 
lagged one-year-ahead forecast errors ( t tiMAE 1,  ,
t
tiRMSE 1,  ).  I adopt the lagged absolute stock 
returns of firm i at the end of financial year t–1, 1, tiR .  The remaining variables of models (7) 
and (8) are defined as in model (3). 
The introduction of the above dummies for the five-year period fD ( f  –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2) 
is the novel component of models (7) and (8).  Firstly, they demonstrate the changes in analysts’ 
forecast bias and errors in the five-year period.  This result shows whether analysts treat a 
refocusing announcement as a temporary event or not.  Secondly, I conjecture that analysts’ 
reactions to information about their past errors and the historical stock returns during the five-
year period might differ from their reactions in the rest of the period. Because of the uncertainty 
associated with a refocusing announcement (Alford and Berger 1999; Penman, 2010; Donelson 
et al., 2011; Wahlen, Baginski and Bradshaw, 2011) analysts might try to capture all related 
information, seeking to minimise their bias or errors. If so, this would prompt them not to 
underreact to the past information (Stickel, 1989; Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens, 1998; Barron, 
18 
 
Byard and Yu, 2008; also see footnote 2). This supposition differs from the literature which 
shows a positive bias and positive serial correlation in analysts’ forecast errors (Ali et al., 1992).   
In order to confirm the results of models (7) and (8), I also modify Chaney et al.’s (1999) 
model, which is as follows: 
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(10) 
where for model (9) tiRestruct , denotes the restructuring charges for firm i divided by its total 
sales at the end of financial year t.
6
 1, tiEr  is a common term, which represents firm i’s current-
year earnings forecast error ( 11,


t
tiEr ), or its one-year-head earnings forecast error (
2
1,


t
tiEr ) in year 
t+1.  If analysts treat the effect of restructuring charges in year t as temporary, then their forecast 
errors in year t+1 should not be affected.  Therefore, the coefficient 
2 is expected to be 
statistically insignificant.  1, tiEr  is the second common term, which denotes the lagged earnings 
forecast error in year t–1, prior to the year of recording restructuring charges.  It can be replaced 
by firm i’s lagged current-year earnings forecast error ( 11,


t
tiEr ), or its lagged one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast error ( ttiEr 1,  ).  If analyst learn from their past forecast errors, the coefficient 1
should be statistically insignificant.  Otherwise, it could be positively significant according to 
Chaney et al. (1999) and Ali et al. (1992).  Similarly, I include the lagged stock returns in year t, 
                                                          
6 I also replace the restructuring charges by a dummy for the refocusing announcement year and reach the same 
conclusion. 
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tiR , , in relative to the dependent variable 1, tiEr  in year t+1, in order to examine whether 
analysts digest the information revealed in historical stock returns about future earnings.  If they 
do so, the coefficient  3  should be statistically insignificant. Otherwise, it could be positively 
significant. 1, tiFq  describes the logarithm for the number of analysts issuing forecasts in the first 
month before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t+1 (m1).  As the number of 
analysts issuing forecasts for a firm increases, the mean forecast error should decrease.  
Therefore, its coefficient 
4  is expected to be negative.  Like model (3), I include mtRECESS 121  
to control the effect of economic recession in the past 12 months of year t+1.  1,, tidHindex  is for 
controlling the effect of competition for firm i in industry d in year t+1.   
For model (10), 1, tiEr is a common term, which denotes firm i’s current-year mean absolute 
forecast error ( 11,


t
tiMAE ), or current-year root mean square forecast error (
1
1,


t
tiRMSE ) in year t+1.  
It can be replaced by one-year-head mean absolute forecast error ( 21,


t
tiMAE ), or one-year-ahead 
root mean square forecast error ( 21,


t
tiRMSE ) in year t+1.  The absolute value of lagged stock 
return of firm i in year t, tiR , , is adopted accordingly. Other variables are defined as in model 
(3) and as presented in Table 1.   
(Insert Table 1 here) 
3.3 Analysts’ forecast revisions in response to good news and bad news 
Hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c concentrate on how analysts adjust forecasts in response to 
good news (upward market movement) and bad news (downward market movement). I derive 
the following model (11) based on the work of Basu (1997), Helbok and Walker (2003) and Mak 
et al. (2011). 
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(11) 
where 
t
tiFRV ,  and tiAR ,  are defined at model (3).  B is a dummy variable equal to 1 if tiAR ,  is 
negative (denoting bad news) and 0 if tiAR ,  is positive (denoting good news).  I use abnormal 
stock returns ( tiAR , ) of firm i in year t because they indicate good or bad news after comparing 
with the average performance of other firms in the capital market7. tiBAR ,  denotes the interactive 
variable of firm i’s bad news and excess stock returns in year t.  ( B )  measures the sensitivity 
of current-year forecast revisions to good news (incremental bad news) across non-refocusing 
firms’ firm years.  Rf is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a refocusing firm and is 0 
otherwise.  r  ( rB, ) measures the incremental sensitivity of current-year earnings forecast 
revisions to good (bad) news across refocusing firms’ non-refocusing years. As defined in model 
(3), in order to capture the effect of refocusing announcement on current-year earnings forecast 
revisions, I introduce fD  to represent the refocusing announcement year and two years on either 
side, where f takes the values of –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2.  fD  is incremental good news intercept. 
BD f  is incremental bad news intercept terms. f ( fB, ) measures the changes in the 
incremental sensitivity of current-year earnings forecast revisions to good (bad) news in the five-
year period. If analysts perceive good (bad) news connected with refocusing announcements, 
                                                          
7 Previous studies use stock returns of firm i at the end of financial year t (
tiR , ) to denote the good or bad news 
perceived by investors.  However, this method ignores the degree of the good or bad news in contrast with the 
market performance on average.  I reach the same conclusion using 
tiR , . 
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they will adjust their earnings forecasts upward (downward) in the refocusing announcement 
year. Then, in the refocusing announcement year, the coefficient 0  ( 0,B ), is expected to be 
negatively (positively) significant in line with hypothesis H2a.  The coefficients 2 , 1  , 1  
and 2  ( 2,B , 1,B , 1,B , 2,B ) denote analysts’ adjustments for current-year earnings forecasts 
due to good (bad) news in years –2, –1, 1 and 2. Other variables are defined by model 3 and 
Table 1.  The current-year earnings forecast revisions 
t
tiFRV ,  can be replaced by one-year-ahead 
earnings forecast revisions (
1
,
t
tiFRV ) or current-year target price forecast revisions (
t
tiTPRV , ) in 
year t. 
4 Sample and data 
4.1 Sampling criteria for identifying refocusing firms 
I adopt the sampling criteria provided in Mak (2014).  They are as follows. 
a) UK listed industrial firms 
All firms selected in this study are UK industrial firms quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) according to the 2010 version of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). 
Financial institutions and banks are excluded from this study because accounting standards and 
accounting policies differ from those of industrial firms. Diversified firms appearing in more 
than one SIC group are allocated to the SIC group in which their refocused business operates. 
b) Sample period and refocusing announcement dates 
Industrial firms’ refocusing announcements and dates must fall between 1 January 2000 and 
31 December 2009. This period covers the entire economic cycle of the UK for the 2000s. In 
addition, it is possible to examine the effect of refocusing activities on analysts’ forecasts in the 
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two years before (1998 and 1999) and two years after (2010 and 2011) the event years. To 
eliminate any effect of former refocusing activities undertaken by the sampled firms in the 
1990s, firms that had announced any refocusing activity in the two years before 2000 are 
excluded. Following a standard event-study approach, firms’ first refocusing announcements and 
announcement dates were collected.
8
  
c) Changes in business direction 
A refocusing firm must indicate a change in its strategic direction corresponding with one of 
three types of corporate refocusing activities, according to the definition of refocusing presented 
at section 1 Introduction.  UK industrial firms are classified as non-refocusing firms if there were 
no refocusing announcements during the sample period. 
4.2 Procedures for identifying refocusing firms 
A list of the names of all the UK industrial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
including delisted firms from 2000 to 2009, was downloaded from the 2013 version of the 
London Share Price Database (LSPD). Then, full-text articles of firms’ official refocusing 
announcements, related news, conference announcements and analysis reports were captured 
from one website and two databases in the following sequence: (1) www.ukbusinesspark.com, 
(2) Perfect Information Navigator, and (3) Financial Times (FT), provided by the ProQuest 
ABI/INFORM Global New Platform and Free E-journals. I used both the firm-name search and 
the clause-text search functions. The keywords were ‘refocusing’, ‘restructuring’, ‘assets 
restructuring’, ‘rationalisation’, ‘reorganisation’, ‘rejuvenation’, ‘streamlining’, ‘consolidation’, 
                                                          
8 According to International Accounting Standard (IAS) 37 par. 12 and 14, managers are obligated to report 
provisions for restructuring charges if a detailed formal plan for restructuring is announced and has raised a valid 
expectation among those affected (Alexander and Archer, 2012). Therefore, my approach of adopting firms’ first 
refocusing announcement is valid.  
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‘cost cutting/reduction/savings’, ‘repositioning’, ‘shake-up’, and ‘reshape/reshaping’. I read the 
content of all downloaded full-text articles to identify the refocusing firms and to check that their 
announcement dates matched the above sampling criteria. This search provided 6,330 full-text 
articles and 4,831 short paragraphs for 841 refocusing firms, containing news about refocusing 
announcements between the specified dates.  
4.3 Sample and data 
Table 2 reports the sample structure, the distribution of UK listed industrial firms’ first 
refocusing announcements and the I/B/E/S data collected. Panel A shows SIC 4 is the largest 
group, with a refocusing rate of 37%. SIC 2 is the second-largest group, with a low refocusing 
rate of 18.81%. SIC 3 has a refocusing rate of 34.67%. SICs 1 and 5 are small groups, with high 
refocusing rates of 50.2% and 62.1%, respectively. SIC 0 is the smallest group, with a refocusing 
rate of 44.44%. The average refocusing rate across all industry groups is 34.76%. The final 
number of refocusing firms is 724, excluding those without a Datastream firm code (32), those 
without an I/B/E/S firm code (59), and those that announced refocusing in 2010 (26). The final 
number of non-refocusing firms is 1,359 after excluding 437 firms without an I/B/E/S firm code.  
Panel B presents the number of UK listed industrial firms announcing their first refocusing in 
the period from 2000 to 2009 as a percentage of all LSE industrial firms in each year, after 
excluding firms that had announced refocusing in previous years. It illustrates that there were 
two waves of refocusing. The first took place at a rate of 5.58% in 2000 to 5.67% in 2004, 
reaching a peak of 8.01% in 2002. This refocusing might have resulted from the 9/11 attacks in 
New York. Although the UK GDP in this period was stable and even increased slightly, some 
industries, such as airlines, were deeply affected. The second period of intensified refocusing 
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was at a rate of 5.54% in 2008 to 5.57% in 2009. This might have been a consequence of the 
mid-2007 credit crunch, the effects of which were not felt until 2008 and 2009. For the 
remaining periods, the refocusing rate remained below 5%. The average annual percentage of 
firms announcing a first-time refocusing was 5.83%, and this result indicates that UK listed 
industrial firms experienced a higher frequency of corporate refocusing activities in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s (see Mak et al., 2011). 
Panel C reports the number of observations for analysts’ primary current-year EPS forecasts 
(in Fiscal year 1), one-year-ahead EPS forecasts (in Fiscal year 2), and current-year target price 
forecasts. It shows that the numbers of observations of refocusing firms’ forecasts exceeded 
those of non-refocusing firms. This might be because most refocusing firms are larger than non-
refocusing firms and thus are followed by more financial analysts. The primary EPS forecast 
data run from 1998 to 2011, but current-year target price forecast data run only from 2003 to 
2011. This is because I/B/E/S target price forecasting data for UK industrial firms is available 
only since 2002.  
To enhance data accuracy and consistency, I take firms’ financial year-end dates, their 
earnings announcement dates and the identities of analysts and broker houses from the I/B/E/S 
Detail file. This information is then used to recalculate the consensus forecasts. According to the 
I/B/E/S user manual version 2013 (see footnote 2), all exceptional and extraordinary items may 
be included or excluded in the realised EPS forecasts. This depends on the base the majority of 
contributors or analysts adopt to value the stocks.  Therefore, I collect the realised EPS from the 
Actual file to avoid bias arising from exaggerating forecast errors, as suggested by Keane and 
Runkle (1998) and Hanna (1999). Accounting data and market data are collected from 
Datastream according to firms’ financial year end dates. No limitation is placed on firms’ 
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financial year ends to avoid bias toward large firms. The only limitation imposed by this criterion 
is that there are limited numbers of financial analysts tracing small and medium-sized firms and 
leading to the limited observations. The 5% top- and bottom-ranked data for each year are 
excluded as outliers.  I obtain similar results and reach the same conclusion when adopting a 1% 
exclusion criterion.  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
4.4 Propensity score matched refocusing and non-refocusing firms 
Chaney et al. (1999, p.267) recognise that their study fails to distinguish between the effects 
of reporting a restructuring charge on analysts’ forecasts and the underlying conditions that 
triggered the restructuring. This is because their sample includes only restructuring firms and 
thus consists of firm year observations with and without restructuring charge announcements for 
the same firms. Thus, firm year observations without restructuring charges denote the control for 
those with restructuring charges. Moreover, firms’ financial characteristics in the pre- and post-
restructuring periods differ. Therefore, firm year observations without restructuring charges do 
not deliver proper controls. To address these problems, I adopt a propensity score analysis and 
matching procedures to construct the dataset for propensity score matched (PSM) refocusing 
firms and non-refocusing firms (Lee, 2005; Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larcker, 2010). This 
dataset is used for deriving all subsequent empirical results. Accordingly, firms’ decisions to 
announce refocusing are analysed as treatments. This analysis can thereby examine whether 
analysts’ forecasts for the firms that chose to announce refocusing differ from the forecasts for 
firms that had similar characteristics and the potential to refocus, but chose not to do so. The 
literature concerning refocusing identifies the firm-level characteristics of firms before 
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announcing their refocusing (Berger and Ofek, 1999; Haynes et al., 2003; Colak, 2010). Thus, I 
introduce the key characteristics into the following binominal logistic model to derive firms’ 
likelihood of announcing refocusing (propensity score) in each year.  
 
ti
d
tddti
titi1i,tmtititi
SICIndadjROA
DtoEqBTMVlogMVCAR
,
4
0
,1,5
1,41,3212,1,,
                                     
0,1 RefocusPr








 
(12) 
where Pr(Refocus1,0) equals 1 if firm i announces refocusing in year t and is 0 otherwise. 
mtiCAR 12,  denotes the cumulated abnormal stock returns for firm i for the preceding 12 months 
of year t. 1, tilogMV  represents annual nature logarithm of market value of equity for firm i at the 
end of financial year t–1.  1, tiBTMV is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 
for firm i at the end of financial year t–1. 1, tiDtoEq denotes the ratio of total liabilities divided by 
book value of equity for firm i at the end of financial year t–1. 1, tiIndadjROA describes the 
industry-adjusted return on total net assets for firm i at the end of financial year t‒1. tidSIC ,,  
represents an industry group dummy (d) for firm i in year t.  It is one digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) group, from SIC 0 to 5.  For example, it equals one if firm i operates in SIC 
0 in year t and is zero for the rest of the SIC groups.  I apply the same fashion to set industry 
group dummies for the rest of the firms.  In the above model, year t includes firms that 
announced refocusing in year t, firms that announced refocusing for the first time after year t, 
and firms that never announced refocusing throughout the sample period.  
Panel A of Table 3 reports the majority of the independent variables are statistically 
significant at 1%, except for 1, tiIndadjROA , SIC 2, 3 and 4. I match refocusing firms to non-
refocusing firms based on their propensity scores by developing a 5 to 1 digit Greedy Match SAS 
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programme based on the work of Guo and Fraser (2010) and Parsons (2001). I identify 490 pairs 
of PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms; of these, 3.87%, 13.27%, 44.29%, 37.76% 
and 0.81% are matched by 5, 4, 3, 2 or 1 digit of the propensity score. In total, 233 refocusing 
firms cannot be matched using the above programme. The quality of this matching requires 
confirmation, which can be achieved by maintaining the covariance balance of the above 
independent variables between the matched refocusing and non-refocusing firms. This implies 
that the differences in magnitude of the variables between the matched refocusing and non-
refocusing firms should be statistically insignificant, as confirmed by the results for Panel B, 
which shows the t-test for means, the Wilcoxon sign rank test, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for medians, reflecting that the differences between these variables are statistically insignificant.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
4.5 Descriptive statistics  
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables for 490 pairs of PSM refocusing 
firms and non-refocusing firms in Panels A and B.  It shows that
1, tiIndadjROA , mtiCAR 12,   and 
tiOItNTA , are left-skewed.  The variables for refocusing firms’ accounting performance                
( tiOItNTA , and 1, tiIndadjROA ), firm size ( 1, tilogMV ), and leverage ( 1, tiDtoEq ) are slightly higher 
than those of non-refocusing firms. Refocusing firms’ market performance (
mtiCAR 12,  , tiAR , ), 
operating risk (
1, tiBTMV ), forecast revisions and forecast errors are slightly lower than those of 
non-refocusing firms.   
(Insert Table 4 here) 
4.6 Additional univariate analysis   
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These analyses are not tabulated due to the limitation of space but are available upon request.  
I compare the analysts’ current-year earnings forecast revisions ( t
tiFRV , ) between 111 pairs of 
PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms in the five-year period centred on refocusing 
announcement year.  The results show that PSM refocusing firms’ t
tiFRV , decline from –0.0061 
(year –2) to –0.012 (year 0) before slightly increase to –0.0065 (in year 2).  However, PSM non-
refocusing firms’ t
tiFRV , are a random walk.  The differences in revisions between the two 
sample groups in years 0 (–0.0075), 1 (–0.0048) and 2 (–0.0062) are statistically significant at 
5%.     
Secondly, I compare one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions ( 1,
t
tiFRV ) between 92 pairs 
of PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms.  The results show that PSM refocusing firms’ 
1
,
t
tiFRV decline from –0.0057 in year –2 to –0.0107 in year 0 and slightly increase to –0.0105 in 
year 2.  PSM non-refocusing firms’ 1,
t
tiFRV  display a similar trend, but their magnitude is less 
negative.  The differences in 1,
t
tiFRV  between the two sample groups of firms in years 0            
(–0.0055), 1 (–0.006) and 2 (–0.0076) are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  These results suggest that analysts are continuously revising their 1,
t
tiFRV  
downward in years 0, 1 and 2, but they remain optimistic.  These results are consistent with those 
of Chaney et al. (1999).      
Thirdly, I compare the current-year target price revisions ( ttiTPRV , ) between 182 pairs of 
PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms over the five-year period.  The results show that 
analysts revise ttiTPRV ,  downward to –0.0993 in year –1.  They revise 
t
tiTPRV ,  upward in years 0 
(0.0535), 1 (0.0123) and 2 (0.0312).  However, PSM non-refocusing firms’ ttiTPRV ,  are a random 
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walk.  The difference in t
tiTPRV ,  between the two groups of firms in year –1 (–0.1063) is 
statistically significant at 1%.  These results imply analysts may have already adjusted their 
valuation of firms because of the operating performance in the year before the refocusing 
announcement.  As there is no further downward adjustment after year –1, analysts might 
therefore be treating the effect of the refocusing announcement as short term.              
Fourthly, I compare the current-year earnings forecast errors ( t
tiEr , ) between 137 pairs of 
PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms over the five-year period.  The results show that 
refocusing firms’ ttiEr ,  increase from –0.0044 in year –2 to –0.0152 in year 0 and slightly 
decrease to –0.0104 in year 2.  The results for the PSM non-refocusing firms demonstrate the 
same trend of changes with a smaller magnitude.  The differences in ttiEr ,  between two groups of 
firms are significant at 10% to 1%, except in year –2.  These results indicate the analysts are 
optimistic across years –1 to 2.   
For current-year mean absolute errors (
t
tiMAE , ) and root mean square errors (
t
tiRMSE , ), the 
results show that the differences in 
t
tiMAE ,  between PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing 
firms are positively significant across the five-year period.  The results of t tiRMSE ,  are similar.  
These indicate that analysts’ forecast accuracy for refocusing firms is lower than that for non-
refocusing firms. 
Fifthly, I compare the one-year-ahead earnings forecast errors ( 1,
t
tiEr ) between 109 pairs of 
PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms over the five-year period.  The results show that 
refocusing firms’ 1,
t
tiEr  are less than those of non-refocusing firms.  The differences in 
1
,
t
tiEr  
between two groups of firms in years –2, (–0.0117), –1 (–0.0125) and 1 (–0.0039) are 
statistically significant at 1%.   
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 Finally, the results also show that the differences in one-year-ahead mean absolute errors       
(
1
,
t
tiMAE ) and one-year-ahead root mean square error (
1
,
t
tiRMSE ) between refocusing firms and 
non-refocusing firms over the five-year period are positively significant at 1%.  These results 
suggest that analysts’ accuracy in the case of one-year-ahead earnings forecasts is lower for 
refocusing firms than for non-refocusing firms. 
5 Results 
5.1 Analysts’ forecast revisions 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating model (3) based on the panel data for 490 pairs of 
PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms across the sample period. The second column presents 
the results associated with the effect of refocusing announcements on current-year earnings 
forecast revisions ( ttiFRV , ). It is necessary to focus on the results of dummies of the five-year 
period first. The coefficient for the refocusing announcement year dummy (
0D ) is negatively 
significant at 5%, after controlling for the effects of operating loss ( 0,0 iOID ), unexpected 
earnings ( 0,0 iUNEXPD ), and the interactive term ( 0,0,0 ii OIUNEXPD ) in the same year. However, 
2D , 1D , 1D and 2D  are statistically insignificant. This implies that analysts revise current-year 
earnings forecasts downward, on average, after learning of refocusing announcements in year 0. 
They might then believe that incremental information about firms’ operational changes, released 
by refocusing announcements, is more likely to lead to a further decline in earnings relative to 
former earnings forecasts. This expectation does not exclude the possibility of an improvement 
in earnings performance long term. Furthermore, the presence of operating loss and unexpected 
earnings does not affect the forecast revisions associated with refocusing announcements. 
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 For the remaining years, the coefficient for operating loss ( tiOI , ) is negatively significant at 
1%. This implies that analysts revise current-year earnings forecasts downward in the presence 
of operating losses. The coefficient for unexpected earnings ( tiUNEXP , ) is positively significant 
at 0.1%, suggesting analysts estimate that the unexpected component of earnings will persist into 
the following year. However, the coefficient for titi OIUNEXP ,, is statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient for excess stock returns ( tiAR , ) is positively significant at 0.1%, suggesting that 
analysts do refer to firms’ historical market performance when generating earnings forecasts. The 
coefficients for other control variables are statistically insignificant. These pieces of evidence 
correspond to hypothesis H1a and the work of both Chaney et al. (1999, 2000) and Clement et 
al. (2011). 
The fourth column reports the results of the effect of refocusing announcements on analysts’ 
one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions ( 1,
t
tiFRV ). The coefficients for 0D , 1D  and 2D  are 
negatively significant at 5% and 10% after controlling for the effects of operating loss, 
unexpected earnings and the joint effect of the two scenarios. This suggests that analysts adjust 
their 1,
t
tiFRV  according to the progress of the refocusing. They might expect that refocusing 
announcements and related activities will affect firms’ future sustainability of earnings 
performance.  
For the remaining years, the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient for tiOI ,   
are very similar to those in the second column. The coefficient for tiUNEXP ,  is positively 
significant at 0.1%. The magnitude is higher than that for the second column, suggesting that 
analysts adjust their 1,
t
tiFRV to reflect their views concerning the persistence of unexpected 
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components of earnings in following years. The coefficient for titi OIUNEXP ,,  is negatively 
significant at 0.1%, suggesting that the presence of operating losses affects analysts’ views of 
unexpected earnings. The coefficients for other control variables are statistically insignificant. In 
general, the results in the fourth column are stronger than those in the second column, as the adj. 
R-sq. is higher. These results are broadly consistent with hypothesis H1b.  
The fifth column reports the results for the effect of refocusing announcements on current-
year target price revisions ( ttiTPRV , ). The coefficients for 1D  and 1D  are negatively significant 
at 5%, and that for 0D  is insignificant after controlling for the effects of operating losses, 
unexpected earnings and the joint effect of both scenarios. This indicates that analysts adjust 
t
tiTPRV ,  downwards significantly in the year prior to and the year after the refocusing 
announcements.  
For the remaining years, the coefficients for tiOI , , tiUNEXP ,  and titi OIUNEXP ,,  are 
statistically insignificant. This implies that analysts might consider other factors when setting 
their target price. In cases of refocusing, they are likely to have expectations about the 
sustainability of firms’ earnings in the post-refocusing period. Analysts apparently refer to firms’ 
historical stock returns and the economic recession when adjusting target prices, as the 
coefficients for tiAR ,  and mtRECESS 12  are statistically significant at 0.1%. These results are 
consistent with hypothesis H1c.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
5.2 Analysts’ forecast errors based on models (7) and (8) 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating models (7) and (8) based on the panel data of 490 
pairs of PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms. These two models examine the changes in 
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current-year and one-year-ahead forecast errors and absolute forecast errors in the-five year 
period. In addition, they examine whether analysts derive forecasts efficiently, learning from 
their past errors and reflecting all information revealed in past stock returns regarding firms’ 
future earnings in the five-year period and the rest of the period. The first four columns of Table 
6 report the results for both the current-year forecast errors ( t
tiEr , ) and the absolute forecast 
errors ( t
tiMAE , ,
t
tiRMSE , ).  
The second column shows that the coefficients for 
1D and 0D  are negatively significant at 
1% and 5%, respectively. This implies analysts overestimate current-year earnings in these two 
years. However, there are no more overestimations in years 1 and 2. The coefficients for previous 
errors in the five-year period (from 3,2  iErD to 1,2 iErD ) are all statistically insignificant. This 
suggests that analysts do learn from past errors when encountering the uncertainty due to the 
decline in firms’ earnings performance before a refocusing announcement and the uncertainty 
associated with the refocusing announcements, including post-refocusing earnings performance. 
The coefficients for the lagged stock returns in the five-year period (from 3,2  iRD to 1,2 iRD ) are 
all statistically insignificant. This implies that during these years, analysts do reflect the 
information revealed in past stock returns about future earnings. Therefore, their current-year 
earnings forecasts for these years are efficient. For the rest of the period, the coefficients for past 
errors ( 1, tiEr ) and lagged stock returns ( 1, tiR ) are positively significant at 0.1%. This suggests 
analysts do not learn from former errors or reflect the information revealed in past stock returns 
during the rest of the period.  
 The third column reports the results for current-year mean absolute errors ( t tiMAE , ). Only 
the coefficient for 1D is positively significant at 5%; the remainder are statistically insignificant. 
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This suggests that the analysts’ current-year earnings forecasts during the five-year period are 
accurate. The coefficients relating to the majority of the past absolute errors (from 3,2  iErD  to 
1,2 iErD ) and the lagged stock returns (from 3,2  iRD  to 1,2 iRD ) for the five-year period are 
statistically insignificant. This implies analysts do learn from former errors and reflect on the 
information revealed in past stock returns. For the rest of the period, only the coefficient related 
to past errors ( 1, tiEr ) is positively significant at 0.1%. This result is similar to those in the 
second column.  
The fourth column reports the results for the current-year root mean square forecast errors 
( t tiRMSE , ), which are very similar to those in the third column; in particular, none of the 
coefficients for the five-year period dummies (from 
2D  to 2D ) are statistically significant. 
Therefore, hypothesis H1d is rejected. 
The fifth, sixth and seventh columns report the results of one-year-ahead forecast errors 
(
1
,
t
tiEr ), mean absolute errors (
1
,
t
tiMAE ) and root mean square forecast errors (
1
,
t
tiRMSE ). The 
coefficients for the five-year period dummies (from 2D  to 2D ) of these three models are all 
statistically insignificant. This means that the analysts’ one-year-ahead forecasts are not biased 
and are accurate. Furthermore, it appears that they learn from previous errors and reflect on the 
information revealed in past stock returns because the majority of the related independent 
variables in the five-year period (from 3,2  iErD to 1,2 iErD , from 3,2  iErD  to 1,2 iErD , from 
3,2  iRD to 1,2 iRD , and from 3,2  iRD  to 1,2 iRD ) are statistically insignificant. On the other 
hand, they do not derive forecasts efficiently in the rest of the period. The coefficients 1, tiEr ,
1, tiEr , 1, tiR and 1, tiR  for the three models are all positively significant at 0.1%. The above 
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results reject hypothesis H1e.  
 In summary, when following these UK industrial firms, analysts overestimate the current-
year earnings forecasts in the year before the refocusing announcement and in the refocusing 
announcement year. Their earnings forecasts are not biased and are no less accurate in the two 
years following refocusing announcements. They learn from their past errors and reflect on the 
information revealed by past stock returns. However in the rest of the period, the results indicate 
that analysts’ earnings forecasts are not efficient. This might be because analysts try to capture 
all related information to minimise bias or errors in the face of declines in firms’ earnings 
performance prior to refocusing announcements and the uncertainty brought by the refocusing 
announcements. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
5.3  Analysts’ forecast errors based on models (9) and (10)  
To confirm my results for models (7) and (8) further, I estimate models (9) and (10) based on 
the panel data of 490 pairs of PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms. These models examine 
the effects of the restructuring charges incurred in refocusing announcement year t ( tiRestruct , ) 
on analysts’ current-year and one-year-ahead forecast errors in the year after the refocusing 
announcement year t9.  
Table 7 shows that the coefficient for tiRestruct ,  is statistically insignificant in all models. 
This suggests that analysts do not make any material current-year or one-year-ahead forecast 
errors and absolute forecast errors in the year following the announcement of restructuring 
charges. Their forecasts after announcing restructuring charges are not biased and might also be 
                                                          
9 Following Chaney et al.’s (1999) approach, I exclude the forecast errors for the year the refocusing is announced, 
because the results for Table 6 and the univariate analysis reveal that the forecast errors in the year of the 
announcement is high. I then derive the same regressions including the forecast errors for the year when refocusing 
is announced and reach the same conclusion.  
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accurate. This result differs from that of Chaney et al. (1999) and Lin and Yang (2006).  
Meanwhile, the coefficients for both the lagged current-year and the one-year-ahead forecast 
errors and absolute forecast errors in the year prior to announcing restructuring charges ( ;1, tiEr
1, tiEr ) in all models are positively significant at 0.1%. The coefficients for lagged stock returns 
and lagged absolute returns ( tiR , , tiR , ) are positively significant at 0.1% in all models. These 
results suggest that analysts do not learn from past errors and do not reflect on all information in 
past stock returns in normal times. This is consistent with the findings reported by Ali et al. 
(1992).  
Taken together, the above results confirm the results for models (7) and (8) given in Table 6. 
Hypotheses H1d and H1e are thereby rejected. 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
5.4 Analysts’ forecast revisions in reaction to good and bad news  
In this section, I investigate how analysts revise their earnings forecasts and target price 
forecasts when encountering good news and bad news proxied by the excess stock returns over 
the five-year period centred on the refocusing announcement year. Model (11) is estimated based 
on the panel data of 490 pairs of PSM refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms across the 
sample period. Table 8 reports the results for ttiFRV , , 
1
,
t
tiFRV  and 
t
tiTPRV ,  in three rows. To 
conserve space, the results for the dummy years ( yD ) are not tabulated.  
The results show that the coefficients for the incremental bad news in year 0, 0,i0 BARD
(0.0557) are positively significant at 1%. However, the coefficients for the incremental good 
news in year 0, 0,0 iARD (–0.0066) are statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
0,i0 BARD  is larger than that of 0,0 iARD . This indicates that analysts are more prone to adjusting 
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their current-year earnings forecasts downward in response to downward market movement than 
to adjusting them upward in response to upward market movement. Therefore, null hypothesis, 
H2a is accepted. The results also suggest that analysts adjust their current-year earnings forecasts 
upward in the years before and after refocusing announcement year as the coefficients for 
incremental good news 2, i2 ARD , 1, i1ARD and 1,i1 ARD  are negatively significant at 10%.  
Similar to the above result, the second row in Table 8 presents the results for one-year-ahead 
earnings forecasts, indicating a positively significant coefficient for 0,i0 BARD (0.0475) at 5%. 
However, the coefficient for 0,0 iARD (0.005) is statistically insignificant. This suggests that 
analysts adjust one-year-ahead earnings forecasts downward in the refocusing announcement 
year if there is downward market movement, but not upward movement. The magnitude of 
analysts’ downward adjustments is higher than their upward adjustments. Therefore, hypothesis 
H2b is accepted.  
The third row in Table 8 reports the results for the current-year target price revisions. The 
coefficient for 1,1  iBARD (0.9362) is positively significant at 1% in year –1, while the coefficient 
for 0,0 iARD  (–0.0162) is negatively insignificant. This result differs from those of earnings 
forecast revisions, indicating that analysts adjust target prices downward when following 
downward market movements in the year before the refocusing announcement. Analysts also 
seem to anticipate refocusing announcements. Therefore, hypothesis H2c is rejected.  
I also re-estimate model (11) by replacing market adjust returns ( tiAR , ) with current-year 
earnings forecast errors (
t
tiEr , ) or firms’ stock returns ( tiR , ) as proxies for good news and bad 
news in the same fashion. I obtain consistent results and conclusions.  To conserve space, the 
results are not tabulated.  The above results show that analysts adjust forecasts according to bad 
38 
 
news only in the refocusing announcement year.  Therefore, there is no evidence of post-analyst-
revision drift. 
 (Insert Table 8 here) 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has adopted a standard event study approach to investigate how analysts perceive 
UK listed industrial firms’ refocusing announcements.  It measures analysts’ earnings, target 
price forecasts and forecast errors over a five-year period.  Firstly, the results show that analysts 
adjust current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecasts downward in refocusing 
announcement year and the following two years. These results suggest that they expect that 
firms’ operational performance is likely to decline in the post-refocusing period relative to their 
former earnings forecasts.  They also adjust current-year target prices downward the year before 
and the year after the refocusing announcements.  These results broadly correspond with those 
reported by Chaney et al. (1999, 2000) and Clement et al. (2011).   
Secondly, the results found significant current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
errors only in the year before announcing refocusing and the refocusing announcement year, 
after controlling for the effects of former errors and past stock returns.  There are no significant 
forecast errors in the years following refocusing announcements.  These results are different 
from those reported by Chaney et al. (1999) and Lin and Yang (2006).  In addition, most 
coefficients of past forecast errors and past stock returns in the five-year period are statistically 
insignificant.  This suggests that analysts following UK industrial firms issue non-biased and 
accurate earnings forecasts in these five years.  They learn from past errors and reflect on the 
information revealed by past stock returns when they face uncertainty associated with refocusing 
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announcements.  However, apart from the five-year period, the results show that their forecasts 
in the rest of the period are inefficient.    
Thirdly, the results show that analysts adjust current-year and one-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts downward with downward market movement (bad news), but not upward with upward 
market movement (good news) in refocusing announcement year.  Furthermore, analysts revise 
current-year target prices downward in the year prior to refocusing announcements.  There is no 
significant adjustment corresponding to good news or bad news after refocusing announcements.  
Therefore, there is no post-analyst-revision drift. 
Overall, the results reveal that analysts’ forecasts for the five-year period are non-biased and 
accurate.  This might be because they are striving to capture all related information to minimise 
forecast bias or errors in the face of any decline in firms’ earnings performance prior to 
refocusing announcement and the uncertainty associated with the refocusing announcements.  In 
the rest of the period, however, they underreact to former errors and past stock returns.  This is 
similar to the findings of previous studies.  
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Figure 1. Illustration of the calculations of mean forecast, forecast revision and forecast error   
This figure illustrates the timeline and concepts used to calculate mean forecast, forecast revision and 
forecast error based on I/B/E/S data of earnings forecast and target price forecast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where m1 denotes 1st-month before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t.  m12 denotes     
12th-month before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t.  The earnings announcement date is 
after the date of financial year end in each year.  Sample firms’ variables of market performance and 
accounting performance are calculated according to the date of financial year end in each year.  Analysts’ 
mean forecasts, forecast revisions and forecast errors for sample firms are calculated according to the 
earnings announcement date in each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings 
announcement 
date of year t 
Year t 
m12 
m1 
Earnings 
announcement 
date of year t-1 
Financial 
year-end 
date of year t 
Financial year-
end date of 
year t-1 
Refocusing 
announcement 
date of year t 
Time line 
46 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions  
Test variables 
t
miF 1,   
Mean current year earnings forecast for firm i in the 1
st 
-month before the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date of year t.  Please see Figure 1. 
t
miF 12,  
Mean current year earnings forecast for firm i in the 12
th
-month before the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement date of year t.   
t
tiFRV ,  
Current year earnings forecast revision for firm i in year t. 
1, tiP  
Firm i’s price per share 12 months before the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year 
t. 
1
1,
t
miF  
Mean one-year-ahead earnings forecast for firm i in the 1
st
 - month before the I/B/E/S 
earnings announcement date of year t.   
1
12,
t
miF  
Mean one-year-ahead earnings forecast for firm i in the 12
th
- month before the I/B/E/S 
earnings announcement date of year t.   
1
,
t
tiFRV  
One-year-ahead earnings forecast revision for firm i in year t. 
t
miTP 1,  
Mean current year target price forecasts for firm i in the 1
st
-month before the I/B/E/S 
earnings announcement date of year t. 
t
miTP 12,  
Mean current year target price forecasts for firm i in the 12
th
-month before the I/B/E/S 
earnings announcement date of year t. 
t
tiTPRV ,  
Current year target price revision for firm i in year t. 
t
tiEr ,   
Current year earnings forecast error for firm i in year t. 
1
,
t
tiEr  
One-year-ahead earnings forecast error for firm i in year t. 
t
tiMAE ,  
Current year mean absolute error for firm i in year t. 
1
,
t
tiMAE  
One-year-ahead mean absolute error for firm i in year t. 
t
tiRMSE ,  
Current year root mean square error for firm i in year t. 
1
,
t
tiRMSE  
One-year-ahead root mean square error for firm i in year t. 
tiFq ,  
The logarithm of the number of analysts issuing forecasts for firm i in the 1
st
- month before 
the I/B/E/S earnings announcement date of year t (m1 in Figure 1). 
fD  
An indicative variable represents the refocusing announcement year and two years on 
either side, where f takes the values of –2, –1, 0, 1 and 2.  
0D  equals 1 if year t is 
refocusing announcement year and is 0 otherwise.  The same fashion for two years before 
(–2, –1) and two years after (1, 2) the refocusing announcement year (0).   
yD  
Year dummies from 2000 to 2011.  It equals 1 if year y is 2000, 0 otherwise.  The same 
fashion for the rest of the years. 
tiOI ,  
An indicator variable equals 1 if the operating income to net total assets ratio of firm i in 
year t ( tiOItNTA , ) is less than zero and is 0 otherwise.    
tiUNEXP ,  Price scaled earnings forecast errors for firm i in year t-1 (
1
1


t
tEr ). 
;,tiR tiR ,  
Stock returns (absolute stock returns) for firm i at the end of financial year t.  Its 
measurement period concludes earlier than the first month prior to the earnings 
announcement date (m1) in Figure 1.  
tiAR ,  
Excess stock returns for firm i at the end of financial year t.  It is the difference between 
firm i’s stock returns and the market returns at the end of financial year t.   
Control variables 
1, tilogMV  
Annual natural logarithm of market value of equity for firm i at the end of financial year   
t–1. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions (continue) 
1, tiBTMV  
Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity for firm i at the end of financial 
year t–1. 
1, tiDtoEq  
Ratio of total liabilities divided by book value of equity for firm i at the end of financial 
year t–1. 
mtRECESS 12  
An indicator equals 1 if an economic recession occurred in the past 12 months of year t. 
tidSIC ,,  
Industry group dummy (d) for firm i in year t.  It is one digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) group, from SIC 0 to 5.  For example, it equals one if firm i operates in 
SIC 0 in year t and is zero for the rest of the SIC groups.  I apply the same fashion to set 
industry group dummy for the rest of the firms. 
tidHindex ,,  
Herfindhal index for firm i in industry d in year t. 
Common terms of models (7),(8), (9) and (10). 
tiEr ,  It represents current year earnings forecast error
t
tiEr , or one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
error 
1
,
t
tiEr . 
1, tiEr  It represents the lagged current-year earnings forecast error and represents  
1
1,


t
tiEr or the 
lagged one-year-ahead earnings forecast error 
t
tiEr 1,  . 
tiEr ,  It represents current-year mean absolute forecast error
t
tiMAE , , current-year root mean 
square forecast error
t
tiRMSE , or one-year-ahead mean absolute forecast error 
1
,
t
tiMAE , 
one-year-ahead root mean square forecast error 
1
,
t
tiRMSE  . 
1, tiEr  It represents the lagged current-year mean absolute forecast error
1
1,


t
tiMAE , the lagged 
current-year root mean square forecast error
1
1,


t
tiRMSE , the lagged one-year-ahead mean 
absolute forecast error 
t
tiMAE 1,  or the lagged one-year-ahead root mean square forecast 
error
t
tiRMSE 1,   . 
1, tiEr  It represents current year earnings forecast error
1
1,


t
tiEr or one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
error 
2
1,


t
tiEr . 
1, tiEr  It represents current-year mean absolute forecast error
1
1,


t
tiMAE , current-year root mean 
square forecast error
1
1,


t
tiRMSE or one-year-ahead mean absolute forecast error 
2
1,


t
tiMAE , 
one-year-ahead root mean square forecast error 
2
1,


t
tiRMSE  . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Sample structure and the distribution of UK listed industrial firms' first corporate refocusing 
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announcements. 
Panel A reports the number of UK listed industrial firms announcing refocusing and those without any refocusing 
announcements.  They are classified by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) groups.  SIC0 = agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting; SIC1 = utilities; SIC2 = mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extractions; SIC3 = 
manufacturing; SIC4 = wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, accommodation 
and food services, and other services (except administration); and SIC5 = construction.  Panel B presents the 
frequency of the first refocusing announcements.  Panel C presents the number of current year and one-year-ahead 
primary EPS and target price forecast observations of refocusing firms and non-refocusing firms.  The primary 
EPS forecast data is from 1998 to 2011 but target price data are from 2003 to 2011.  This is because I/B/E/S has 
been providing target price forecast data for UK industrial firms since 2002.   There are 490 pairs of PSM 
refocusing and non-refocusing firms according to their financial characteristics, which are presented in Table 3.    
Panel A: Sample structure  
       SIC Group 0 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
Initial number of refocusing firms 8 26 87 123 533 64 841 
Less: Missed Datastream firm code 0 1 2 8 20 1 32 
Less: Firms announced refocusing in 2010 0 2 6 1 15 2 26 
Less: Missed I/B/E/S firm code or data 0 2 6 2 47 2 59 
Final number of refocusing firms from 2000-2009 8 21 73 112 451 59 724 
        
Initial number of non-refocusing firms 23 29 409 277 998 60 1796 
Less: Missed I/B/E/S firm code or data 13 10 94 66 230 24 437 
Final number of non-refocusing firms 10 19 315 211 768 36 1359 
 
 
 
 
   Panel C: I/B/E/S data 
  No. of firms 
No. of primary 
current year EPS 
forecasts 
No. of primary 
one-year-ahead 
EPS forecasts 
No. of primary 
target price 
forecasts 
Refocusing firms 724 150,521 153,190 51,096 
Non‒refocusing firms 1,359 77,473 76,578 31,865 
PSM refocusing firms 490 94,775 96,599 35,245 
PSM non‒refocusing firms 490 54,800 55,142 27,993 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Frequency of the first refocusing announcements 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Frequency of first refocusing 
announcements (%) 
5.58 7.77 8.01 6.82 5.67 4.58 3.95 4.78 5.54 5.57 
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Table 3.  490 pairs of Propensity Score Matched refocusing and non-refocusing firms 
There are 490 pairs of Propensity Score Matched (PSM) refocusing and non-refocusing firms derived from the 
following binominal logistic model: 
 
Pr(Refocus1,0) is equal to 1 if a firm i announces refocusing in year t, 0 otherwise.  
tidSIC ,, is one digit Standard 
Industry Classification (SIC) group of firm i in year t.  SIC5 is treated as the base group by the SAS programme.  
Panel A presents the results of the above model.  Panel B presents the covariance balance of independent variables 
between 490 PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms, which is measured by the difference of magnitude of these 
variables.  The remaining independent variables are defined in Table 1.  t-test, Wilcoxon sign rank test and 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote the statistically significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Results of binominal logistic model   
  ti ,
 
1, tiIndadjROA
 
1, tilogMV
 
mtiCAR 12, 
 
1, tiBTMV
 
1, tiDtoEq  
Mean ‒3.8788*** 0.0924 0.3333*** ‒0.285** 0.2125** 0.0018** 
t-test (‒15.32) (0.33) (4.06) (‒2.19) (2.54) (2.88) 
    SIC0 SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 
Mean 
 
‒5.5626** 0.1692 ‒0.3659 ‒0.2068 ‒0.0888 
t-test   (‒2.5) (0.51) (‒1.94) (‒0.80) (‒0.45) 
Panel B:Covariance balance of independent variables between 490 PSM refocusing and non-refocusing firms  
  
1, tiROADiffIndadj
 
1, tiDifflogMV
 
mtiDiffCAR 12, 
 
1, tiDiffBTMV
 
1, tiDiffDtoEq
 
Mean 
 
0.0235 0.0949** 0.0549* ‒0.0305 5.2117 
t-test 
 
(1.63) (2.03) (1.79) (‒0.55) (1.00) 
Median  –0.0035 0.041 0.0245 0.062 3.98 
Wilcoxon sign rank  
 
(0.1) (1.89) (1.71) (0.22) (1.62) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  titid
d
dtitititimtititi SICIndadjROADtoEqBTMVMVCAR ,,,
4
0
1,51,41,31,212,1,,  log0,1 RefocusPr   


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Table 4.  Descriptive analysis 
Please refer to Table 1 for the definition of the following variables. 
 
  Obs. Mean STD Max Median Min Skewness Kurt 
Panel A: 490 PSM  refocusing firms 
     1, tiIndadjROA  4836 –0.01 0.192 0.469 0.015 –1.871 –3.885 24.993 
mtiCAR 12, 
 5101 0.019 0.488 1.694 0.04 –1.694 –0.244 1.117 
1, tilogMV
 6492 1.892 0.897 3.769 1.942 –0.420 –0.129 –0.658 
1, tiBTMV
 6343 0.825 0.992 10 0.575 –2.174 3.777 23.103 
1, tiDtoEq  4905 55.89 82.637 521.25 36.44 –294.05 1.85 7.745 
tiOItNTA ,  5129 0.163 0.72 8.468 0.183 –14.05 –2.771 89.210 
tiAR ,  5468 0.009 0.475 2.207 –0.038 –1.125 0.851 1.741 
tiFq ,  3473 0.200 0.264 1.362 0 0 0.13 0.518 
t
tiFRV ,
 2950 –0.011 0.03 0.056 –0.003 –0.148 –1.758 3.874 
1
,
t
tiFRV
 2580 –0.011 0.028 0.058 –0.004 –0.125 –1.218 2.248 
t
tiEr ,  3331 –0.015 0.046 0.080 –0.002 –0.286 –2.110 6.280 
1
,
t
tiEr  2827 –0.025 0.059 0.102 –0.011 –0.284 –1.390 2.749 
t
tiMAE ,
 3331 0.034 0.048 0.352 0.015 0.0004 2.819 9.330 
1
,
t
tiMAE  2827 0.049 0.057 0.338 0.027 0.001 2.170 5.014 
t
tiRMSE ,  3331 0.035 0.049 0.352 0.016 0.0005 2.820 9.333 
1
,
t
tiRMSE  2827 0.050 0.058 0.339 0.028 0.001 2.171 5.006 
t
tiTPRV ,
 800 0.005 0.349 0.908 0.01 –1.532 –0.398 0.916 
Panel B: 490 PSM non-refocusing firms 
     1, tiIndadjROA  4612 –0.027 0.231 0.469 0.012 –1.849 –3.183 15.027 
mtiCAR 12, 
 4794 0.023 0.504 1.690 0.039 –1.694 –0.136 1.048 
1, tilogMV
 5996 1.789 0.893 3.769 1.789 –0.42 0.077 –0.588 
1, tiBTMV
 5925 0.831 1.093 10 0.543 –2.273 3.579 18.512 
1, tiDtoEq  4765 43.824 79.163 524.140 22.880 –302.53 1.821 9.393 
tiOItNTA ,  4931 0.11 0.92 10.520 0.146 –16.928 –4.763 97.759 
tiAR ,  5102 0.014 0.498 2.215 –0.038 –1.131 0.974 2.021 
tiFq ,  1642 0.139 0.229 1.146 0 0 1.634 2.120 
t
tiFRV ,
 1395 –0.009 0.035 0.161 –0.003 –0.136 –0.283 4.103 
1
,
t
tiFRV
 1216 –0.01 0.035 0.166 –0.004 –0.134 –0.107 3.343 
t
tiEr ,  1705 –0.015 0.055 0.225 –0.003 –0.272 –1.162 5.012 
1
,
t
tiEr  1418 –0.027 0.071 0.228 –0.013 –0.286 –0.667 2.129 
t
tiMAE ,  1705 0.038 0.054 0.334 0.017 0 2.652 7.930 
1
,
t
tiMAE  1418 0.063 0.085 0.66 0.032 0.0002 3.027 11.891 
t
tiRMSE ,  1705 0.038 0.054 0.335 0.018 0 2.633 7.810 
1
,
t
tiRMSE  1418 0.054 0.06 0.324 0.032 0.0002 1.859 3.476 
t
tiTPRV ,
 533 0.088 0.519 2.276 0.023 –1.092 1.007 2.351 
Panel C: Industry variables 
tidHindex ,,  33838 0.106 0.121 0.556 0.041 0.020 1.450 0.949 
mtRECESS 12        1   0     
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Table 5.  The association between analysts’ forecast revisions and refocusing announcements 
The association between forecast revisions and refocusing announcements is examined in the following model:  
ti
y
yytidmtit
f
fififf
f
fiff
f
fiff
f
fftitititi
t
ti
DHindexRECESSAROIUNEXPD
UNEXPDOIDDOIUNEXPUNEXPOIFRV
,
2010
98
,,6125,4
2
2
,,
2
2
,
2
2
,
2
2
,,3,2,1,
                 
 










 
where t
tiFRV ,
denotes current year earnings forecast revision for firm i issued in year t by analysts.  It is replaced by 
one-year-ahead forecast revision ( 1
,
t
tiFRV
) and target price revision ( t
tiTPRV ,
) to derive related results.  Other 
variables are defined in Table 1.  Results for years (
yD ) are not tabulated due to limited space.  *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. 
 t
tiFRV ,
 t-test 1
,
t
tiFRV
 t-test t
tiTPRV ,
 t-test 
tiOI ,
 –0.0097** (–3.12) –0.0097*** (–4.06) –0.0670 (–1.33) 
tiUNEXP ,
 
0.1107
***
 (4.42) 0.4678
***
 (12.93) 0.1876 (0.45) 
titi OIUNEXP ,,
 
0.0027 (0.05) –0.2106*** (–3.77) 0.1242 (0.13) 
2D
 –0.0016 (–0.84) –0.0012 (–0.97) –0.0457 (–1.09) 
1D
 –0.0006 (–0.35) –0.0022 (–1.70) –0.1059* (–2.51) 
0D
 –0.0036* (–1.97) –0.0032* (–2.34) –0.0054 (–0.19) 
1D
 0.0008 (0.48) –0.0029* (–2.08) –0.0584* (–2.06) 
2D
 –0.0005 (–0.31) –0.0055** (–3.30) –0.0478 (–1.61) 
2,2  iOID
 
0.0134
*
 (1.97) 0.0013 (0.24) –0.1817 (–1.84) 
1,1  iOID
 –0.0012 (–0.16) –0.0015 (–0.30) –0.1866 (–1.77) 
0,0 iOID
 
0.0017 (0.17) 0.0060 (1.36) –0.2109* (–2.07) 
1,1 iOID
 
0.0069 (0.78) –0.0023 (–0.40) –0.1114 (–1.75) 
2,2 iOID
 –0.0158 (–1.01) 0.0057 (0.84) 0.0278 (0.23) 
2,2  iUNEXPD
 
0.0220 (0.25) –0.0394 (–0.55) –1.2143 (–0.71) 
1,1  iUNEXPD
 
0.0458 (0.50) 0.0217 (0.31) 5.8944
*
 (2.13) 
0,0 iUNEXPD
 
0.0683 (1.07) –0.1727** (–2.58) 0.9140 (1.11) 
1,1 iUNEXPD
 –0.0070 (–0.12) 0.0039 (0.05) –0.4106 (–0.28) 
2,2 iUNEXPD
 
0.0773 (0.98) –0.2259* (–2.32) 1.0956 (1.07) 
2,2,2  ii UNEXPOID
 0.3574
*
 (2.23) 0.0480 (0.45) –8.3559* (–2.22) 
1,1,1  ii UNEXPOID
 –0.2414 (–1.65) 0.0006 (0.01) –7.8712 (–1.74) 
0,0,0 ii UNEXPOID
 –0.0713 (–0.38) 0.1340 (1.33) –4.5812* (–2.27) 
1,1,1 ii UNEXPOID
 –0.1177 (–0.88) –0.1140 (–0.91) 4.6752* (2.55) 
2,2,2 ii UNEXPOID
 –0.5112** (–2.69) 0.0694 (0.49) –4.2916* (–2.09) 
tiAR ,
 0.0217
***
 (14.08) 0.0008 (0.72) 0.4763
***
 (12.29) 
mtRECESS 12
 0.0019 (0.62) 0.0039 (1.12) –0.2496*** (–6.70) 
tidHindex ,,
 0.0074 (1.73) 0.0061 (1.41) 0.1281 (1.54) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
  –0.0063* (–2.54) –0.0069*** (–4.51) 0.0440 (1.51) 
N 3435  3541  1201  
adj. R
2
 0.167  0.321  0.383  
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Table 6.  The association between analysts’ forecast errors and refocusing announcements due to models (7) 
and (8). 
The association between analysts’ forecast errors and refocusing announcements is examined in the following 
models:  
ti
y
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f f f
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where 
tiEr ,  is a common term and denotes current year earnings forecast errors (
t
tiEr , ) for firm i in year t.  It can be 
replaced by one -year-ahead earnings forecast errors ( 1
,
t
tiEr ).  tiEr , denotes current year mean absolute forecast 
errors ( t
tiMAE , ), and root mean square forecast errors (
t
tiRMSE , ). It can be replaced by one-year-ahead forecast 
errors 1
,
t
tiMAE ,
1
,
t
tiRMSE .  Other variables are defined in Table 1.  Results for years ( yD ) are not tabulated due to 
limited space.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. 
 
 t
tiEr ,  
t
tiMAE ,  
t
tiRMSE ,  
1
,
t
tiEr  
1
,
t
tiMAE  
1
,
t
tiRMSE  
;1, tiEr 1, tiEr
 0.1806
***
 0.4074
***
 0.4200
***
 0.3832
***
 0.4495
***
 0.5229
***
 
;1, tiR 1, tiR
 0.0088
***
 –0.0002 –0.0006 0.0336*** 0.0157*** 0.0125*** 
tiFq ,
 0.0093
***
 –0.0177*** –0.0169*** 0.0095** –0.0213*** –0.0147*** 
2D
 –0.0037 –0.0011 –0.0018 –0.0096 0.0091 0.0163 
1D
 –0.0170*** 0.0111* 0.0108 –0.0047 0.0097 0.0154 
0D
 –0.0120* 0.0118 0.0114 –0.0045 0.0006 0.0057 
1D
 0.0023 –0.0040 –0.0045 –0.0026 –0.0036 0.0010 
2D
 0.0034 0.0080 0.0061 0.0033 –0.0066 –0.0035 
;3, i2ErD 3, i2 ErD
 0.1790 –0.0520 –0.0431 –0.0929 –0.1381 –0.1885 
;2,1  iErD 2, i2 ErD
 –0.0481 –0.1187 –0.1206 0.1399 0.0179 –0.0518 
;1,0 iErD 1,0 iErD
 0.1068 0.0177 0.0115 –0.0826 –0.1723 –0.2139* 
;0,1 iErD 0,1 iErD
 –0.0760 –0.1666* –0.1521* 0.0507 0.0934 0.0310 
;1,2 iErD 1,2 iErD
 0.0434 0.0295 –0.0025 0.1502 0.1364 0.0888 
;3, i2RD 3, i2 RD
 0.0043 0.0009 0.0009 –0.0079 –0.0129 –0.0127 
;2,1  iRD 2,1  iRD
 0.0100 –0.0040 –0.0035 –0.0134 –0.0343** –0.0308* 
;1,0 iRD 1,0 iRD
 –0.0086 –0.0065 –0.0054 0.0019 0.0029 0.0066 
;0,1 iRD 0,1 iRD
 0.0037 –0.0032 –0.0005 –0.0041 –0.0149 –0.0097 
;1,2 iRD 1,2 iRD
 –0.0016 –0.0111 –0.0121 –0.0062 0.0026 0.0065 
2, i2FqD
 
0.0081 –0.0028 –0.0021 0.0068 –0.0058 –0.0110 
1,1  iFqD
 
0.0227
***
 –0.0139* –0.0134* –0.0024 0.0072 0.0022 
0,0 iFqD
 
0.0181
*
 –0.0108 –0.0101 0.0020 0.0122 0.0051 
1,1 iFqD
 –0.0068 0.0116* 0.0102 0.0002 0.0094 0.0042 
2,2 iFqD
 –0.0049 –0.0029 0.0009 0.0026 0.0017 –0.0016 
mtRECESS 12
 –0.0088 –0.0016 –0.0020 –0.0088 0.0228* 0.0246** 
tidHindex ,,
 0.0056 –0.0065 –0.0061 0.0080 –0.0016 –0.0112 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  –0.0031 0.0253*** 0.0254*** –0.0134*** 0.0165*** 0.0127*** 
N 3817 3853 3858 3174 3186 3163 
adj. R
2
 0.098 0.175 0.178 0.269 0.240 0.267 
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Table 7.  The association between analysts’ forecast errors and refocusing announcements die to models (9) 
and (10). 
The following models examine the association between analysts’ forecast errors and restructuring charges: 
1,
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where 
1, tiEr  denotes current year earnings forecast errors (
1
1,


t
tiEr ) for firm i issued at time t+1. It can be replaced by 
one-year-ahead forecast errors ( 2
1,


t
tiEr ).  1, tiEr denotes current year mean absolute forecast errors (
1
1,


t
tiMAE ) and 
root mean square forecast errors ( 1
1,


t
tiRMSE ). It can be replaced by one-year-ahead forecast errors 
2
1,


t
tiMAE ,
2
1,


t
tiRMSE . tiRestruct , denotes the restructuring charges divided by total sales of firm i at the end of financial year 
end t.  Other variables are defined in Table 1 and Section 3.2.  The t statistics are given in parentheses below the 
coefficients.  Results for years (
yD ) are not tabulated due to limited space.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1%  respectively. 
 1
1,


t
tiEr  
1
1,


t
tiMAE  
1
1,


t
tiRMSE  
2
1,


t
tiEr  
2
1,


t
tiMAE  
2
1,


t
tiRMSE  
;1, tiEr 1, tiEr
 0.1132
**
 0.2782
***
 0.2995
***
 0.1574
***
 0.2415
***
 0.2613
***
 
 (3.09) (7.11) (7.99) (5.45) (5.82) (6.58) 
tiRestruct ,  0.0762 0.4498 0.5028 –0.0237 0.0366 0.0539 
 (0.30) (1.39) (1.54) (–0.24) (0.29) (0.39) 
;,tiR tiR ,  
0.0160
***
 0.0037 0.0063
*
 0.0493
***
 0.0237
***
 0.0231
***
 
 (7.03) (1.25) (2.22) (14.79) (5.33) (5.43) 
1, tiFq  0.0111
***
 –0.0190*** –0.0178*** 0.0111*** –0.0166*** –0.0150*** 
 (4.67) (–6.43) (–6.43) (3.66) (–4.95) (–4.51) 
mtRECESS 12  0.0043 –0.0044 –0.0088 –0.0253
*
 –0.0022 0.0014 
 (0.79) (–0.59) (–1.32) (–2.50) (–0.20) (0.12) 
tidHindex ,,
 –0.0027 –0.0140 –0.0132 –0.0082 –0.0167 –0.0109 
 (–0.35) (–1.73) (–1.66) (–0.84) (–1.59) (–1.02) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  –0.0183*** 0.0354*** 0.0348*** –0.0244*** 0.0513*** 0.0494*** 
 (–5.10) (7.21) (7.06) (–7.07) (8.15) (7.95) 
N 2442 2326 2463 1969 1971 1964 
adj. R
2
 0.096 0.106 0.113 0.214 0.121 0.126 
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Table 8.  Analysts’ responses to good and bad news at deriving their earnings forecast revisions and target price revisions 
The association between analysts’ earnings forecast revisions and good and bad news is examined in the following model:  
ti
yr
tiyyByyBtiyyyy
f
fiffBffBtiffff
tirBrBtirrtiBBti
t
ti
BARDBDARDDBARDBDARDD
RfBARRfBRfARRfBARBARFRV
,
2010
98
,,,,
2
2
,,,,
,,,,,,,
)( )(                





 
where t
tiFRV ,  can be replaced by one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions  (
1
,
t
tiFRV ) and target price revision (
t
tiTPRV , ).  There are 14 yD  year 
dummy variables for 1998 to 2011.  
2011D  is treated as a base year for the above model. To save space, year dummies are not tabulated.  Other 
variables are defined in Table 1. The t statistics are given in the parentheses below the coefficients.  a, b, and c indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%and 1% respectively.  
 
   Adj R-Sq F-value Obs.   tiAR ,  B tiBAR ,  Rf  tiRfAR ,  RfB  tiRfBAR ,  
t
tiFRV ,  16.67% 11.58 4,180 –0.0012 0.0105 –0.0024 0.0663c –0.0001 –0.0011 0.0023 0.0100 
    
(–0.17) (0.97) (–0.20) (2.45) (–0.06) (–0.28) (0.67) (1.21) 
1
,
t
tiFRV
 7.01% 4.73 3,706 –0.0064 0.0060 0.0061 0.0109 –0.0012 –0.0038 0.0053 0.0148 
 
      (–0.88) (0.56) (0.50) (0.42) (–0.49) (–0.85) (1.41) (1.59) 
t
tiTPRV ,
 17.67% 42.95 1,307 –0.0302 1.0078c 0.0246 –0.3314 0.1053b –0.4125c –0.0472 0.5841c 
    
(–0.31) (8.31) (0.16) (–0.86) (2.50) (–5.19) (–0.67) (2.93) 
 
  2D  1D  0D  1D  2D  2, i2 ARD
 
1, i1ARD  0,i0 ARD  1,i1ARD  2,i2 ARD  
t
tiFRV ,  
 
0.0012 0.0026 –0.0026 0.0069 0 –0.0156a –0.0157a –0.0066 –0.0165a –0.0060 
  
(0.30) (0.63) (–0.61) (1.61) (0) (–1.85) (–1.65) (–0.63) (–1.71) (–0.63) 
1
,
t
tiFRV
 
 
0.0029 –0.0061 –0.0061 –0.0048 –0.0070 –0.0121 0.0099 0.0050 0.0101 0.0071 
 
  (0.67) (–1.39) (–1.38) (–1.10) (–1.55) (–1.22) (0.90) (0.50) (1.03) (0.80) 
t
tiTPRV ,
 
 
–0.1550 –0.0558 –0.205b –0.0771 –0.0186 0.1379 –0.3607 –0.0162 0.2508 –0.0497 
 
(–1.54) (–0.55) (–2.00) (–0.74) (–0.24) (0.43) (–1.26) (–0.05) (0.89) (–0.23) 
    BD-2  BD-1  BD0  BD1  BD2  2,i-2BARD
 
1,i-1BARD  0,i0BARD  1,i1BARD  2,2 iBARD  
t
tiFRV ,  
 
0.0014 –0.0029 0.0013 0.0045 –0.0051 –0.0013 0.0276a 0.0557c 0.0336a 0.0300 
  
(0.09) (–0.47) (0.20) (0.68) (–0.78) (–0.19) (1.71) (2.85) (1.67) (1.35) 
1
,
t
tiFRV
 0.0047 –0.0058 0.0087 0.0126a 0.0005 0.0106 0.0205 0.0475b 0.0013 0.0200 
 
  (0.27) (–0.85) (1.24) (1.90) (0.08) (1.41) (1.02) (2.55) (0.07) (1.04) 
t
tiTPRV ,
 
 
–0.4647 0.0410 0.0790 0.2770a 0.0663 0.0223 0.9362b 0.4975 0.0431 0.2101 
  
(–0.99) (0.27) (0.58) (1.76) (0.50) (0.19) (2.46) (0.99) (0.11) (0.53) 
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